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TWO WRONGS MAKE A WRONG: A
CHALLENGE TO PLEA BARGAINING AND
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE STATUTES
THROUGH THEIR INTEGRATION
Kevin O’Keefe*
In the modern criminal justice system, adherence to expedience and
pragmatism have contributed to the prevalence of two practices that have
questionable constititional bases: plea bargains and postconviction civil
penalties. Each practice has been challenged in the courts individually and
has survived judicial scrutiny. And as these two practices have become
more commonplace, their continued intersection and interaction has
become increasingly inevitable; however, even a superficial analysis of this
combination of plea bargaining and postconviction civil penalties
demonstrates that the constitutionality of the two practices can no longer be
justified by an uneasy compromise with practicality.
This Comment is intended to illustrate the nature and the extent of the
intersecting practices of plea bargaining and postconviction civil penalties.
Furthermore, by embracing the contract-based approach to the theoretical
justification of plea bargaining, this Comment argues that retroactive
postconviction civil penalty statutes—in particular the most recently
enacted federal sexual offender registration and notification law—should
not survive a due process challenge and accordingly should not apply to
plea-convicted defendants. At the very least, this Comment hopes to
demonstrate that the individually debatable practices of plea bargaining
and postconviction civil penalties have grown and interwoven to such an
extent that, in light of the basic dictates of fairness and due process, the
state has finally gone too far.

*
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and patience that went along with the editing and publication of this Comment. Any errors
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I. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of plea bargaining in the U.S. criminal justice system
is undisputed, though the desirability of such a system has been a subject of
considerable debate for decades.1
Regardless of the constitutional
improprieties and injustices that both sides of the debate recognize as flaws
inherent to the system, both sides acknowledge that plea bargaining derives
most of its justification from the principles of contract.2 The individual
defendant exchanges certain constitutional rights for a more lenient
sentence with absolute certainty.3 The prosecution, as the agent of the state,
foregoes the opportunity to pursue a higher sentence for the defendant and
saves the time and expense of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.4 A closer inspection of the particulars of the plea
bargaining system reveals that the plea bargain is not the classical
theoretical bargain.5 However, the basic justification for its existence is
that, at its most fundamental level, the plea bargain is a mutual exchange of
considerations between two parties: the individual defendant and the state.6
Much like plea bargaining, postconviction civil penalties, arising out
of what are known as collateral consequence statutes, have been part of the
U.S. criminal justice system for a considerable period of time.7 At least
1

See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981); Albert W.
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Russell D. Covey,
Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237
(2008); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1906 (1992);
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The Current
Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
2
See generally Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1. See also Easterbrook, supra note 1, at
1974-75; Schulhofer, supra note 1, at 1980.
3
See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1914.
4
See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1975.
5
In addition to a bilateral asymmetry of information, the parties to a plea bargain will
always be of extremely disproportionate power; setting aside the instances of bargaining
among multiple co-defendants, the only parties to a plea bargain are the individual defendant
and the entire state law enforcement body. For further discussion, see infra Part II.A.
6
See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1912-13.
7
See Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1061-64 (describing
disenfranchisement statutes that were applied against convicted offenders during both the
colonial period and the years following the ratification of the Constitution). For a brief
survey of the more common collateral consequence statutes, see Michael Pinard, An
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634-39 (2006).

2010]

TWO WRONGS MAKE A WRONG

245

with respect to convicted sexual offenders, the use of collateral
consequences to punish individual defendants further after sentencing has
become a pervasive practice in the United States. Most notably, on
September 13, 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (Wetterling Act) was signed
into law.8 Individual states have been creating their own systems of sexual
offender registration since 1947;9 however, with the enactment of the
Wetterling Act, states are now required to devise and implement sexual
offender registration systems.10 While this was by no means the first
instance of a collateral consequence statute, nor the beginning of the trend
towards imposing civil penalties against convicted sexual offenders,11 the
passage of the Wetterling Act represented the first federal imposition of
collateral consequences upon any criminal defendant convicted of a
sexually based offense.12 Through subsequent amendments and bills,
Congress has supplemented this initial mandate with many more
requirements for the state registration systems, most recently in the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Walsh Act).13
Plea bargaining and collateral consequence statutes are two entirely
separate practices, but are similar in the sense that neither seems to comport
with the classic model of criminal justice: a trial followed by a sentence
imposed by the trial court. Additionally, both practices are ubiquitous in
the modern criminal justice system. By way of illustration, in the federal
court system, guilty pleas account for 96% of convictions,14 and over forty
different post-sentence restrictions automatically apply to individuals
convicted of felonies.15
Accordingly, any analysis of collateral
consequence statutes in the modern criminal justice system needs to be
conducted with an eye toward plea bargaining, and vice versa. And because
8
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)).
9
Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past,
Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5 (2008).
10
Wetterling Act § 170101(f)(1).
11
New Jersey is widely credited with enacting the forerunner of modern sex offender
collateral-consequence statutes, Megan’s Law, in 1994. See Logan, supra note 9, at 5; see
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 2005).
12
See Wetterling Act § 170101(f)(1); Logan, supra note 9, at 5.
13
Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16901
(2006)).
14
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.C (2008),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/FigC.pdf.
15
See COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIM. SANCTIONS, A.B.A. & PUB. DEFENDER SERV. FOR
D.C., INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN FEDERAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS app. 2 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/cecs/internalexile.pdf
[hereinafter INTERNAL EXILE].
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these individual practices are so prevalent, the constitutional analyses and
theoretical bases of plea bargaining and collateral consequences should be
revisited with emphasis on their integration.
This Comment focuses on the sexual offender collateral consequence
statutes, and the Walsh Act in particular, for two reasons. First, sexual
offender collateral consequences have often been (and now must be, per the
Walsh Act) applied retroactively.16 In other words, defendants who were
convicted and served their sentences completely prior to the enactment of a
collateral consequence statute are still subject to registration and
notification requirements.17 Second, offenders are assessed civil penalties
by way of the collateral consequence statute based solely on their previous
conviction.18 A defendant’s particular conviction determines whether and
how the collateral consequence statute is applied.19 There are certainly
other retroactively applied collateral consequences, but sexual offender
registration systems under the Walsh Act provide the clearest example of
how the legal justifications for collateral consequence statutes may not
comport with the criminal justice system as it functions today.
Courts have upheld the use of plea bargains to waive constitutional
rights in exchange for a presumably more lenient sentence, most notably in
Brady v. United States.20 Similarly, retroactive collateral consequence
statutes have been found constitutional in response to challenges based on
both the Ex Post Facto Clause21 and procedural due process requirements.22
The problematic aspect, and the thrust of this Comment, is that retroactive
collateral consequence statutes violate the basic justifications for the guilty
plea. In short, when an individual defendant bargains with the state for a

16

Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2009) (“The
requirements of the [Walsh Act] apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted
of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of that Act.”).
17
Id.
18
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety (Walsh) Act of 2006 § 111(2)-(4), Pub. L.
No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (defining sex offender tiers through convictions of crimes that
are comparable to a specified list of federal crimes).
19
By way of comparison, numerous states had enacted and used forward looking
approaches prior to the Walsh Act. Those states would assess the defendant’s risk of
recidivism upon release based on a number of statutory or regulatory factors. That risk
assessment would in turn define the extent of the duration of required registration and also
the extent of community notification that his or her release would entail. See e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 12-12-917 (Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(1) (LexisNexis 1999
& Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-37.1-6(b)
(Supp. 2008).
20
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
21
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
22
E.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
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specific, more lenient sentence,23 a retroactive collateral consequence
statute is a unilateral change in terms by the state after the bargain, which
adds to the defendant’s offered consideration, consisting of the bargainedfor sentence. This Comment argues that such retroactive statutes are a
breach of the original contract by the state, and therefore plea-bargained
defendants that are subject to these statutes should have some remedy
available, such as non-application of the retroactive statute if not outright
rescission of the original agreement.
In a purely contractual context, a plea-convicted defendant’s right to
challenge the application of retroactive statutes seems fair and intuitive, but
there are several legal hurdles to overcome before an argument for remedy
or rescission based on contract law will appear legally legitimate and nonfrivolous. As a threshold matter, a purely contractual approach to revisiting
a plea bargain is almost irrelevant in practice, because principles of contract
law and criminal law have had an uneasy coexistence with respect to plea
bargaining. Quite simply, there are certain inherent aspects of plea
bargaining that are antithetical to the assumptions of the classic theoretical
contract.24
Furthermore, there are several established principles of contract law
that a defendant would have to overcome in order to receive a remedy. The
sovereign acts doctrine, as originally recognized in Horowitz v. United
States,25 creates a considerable hurdle for an individual to properly assert
that the legislative acts of the state can be viewed as acts of a contracting
party.26 Additionally, the question of risk assumption in the context of
guilty pleas has considerable bearing on whether stronger remedies, such as
non-application of the statute or rescission, may be justified.27 Finally,
there is the issue of whether application of these retroactive collateral
consequence statutes can even be considered a breach of the agreement.28

23

It is the court, and not the government, that has the ultimate sentencing authority in
every plea bargain case. However with very few exceptions, the resulting sentence in actual
practice is always either the bargained sentence or within the bargained range of sentences.
See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1973.
24
See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1974; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1911-13.
Several examples are discussed infra Part III.A.
25
267 U.S. 458 (1925).
26
Id. at 461.
27
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981).
28
As with any contract, the issue of whether there is a breach is not always clear,
particularly in light of the fact that the collateral consequence statutes at issue will have been
enacted years after many of the plea bargains were thought to have been fully performed.
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of existence of breach in the context of
performance of services contemplated in a plea bargain. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467
U.S. 504, 509-11 (1984).
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Even if the ultimate remedies of rescission or non-application of the
civil penalty are not available, this Comment intends to demonstrate that
while plea bargaining and retroactive collateral consequences are both
accepted and prevalent practices in the U.S. criminal justice system, the
combination of the two is not theoretically justified. At the very least, one
or both systems should be reevaluated in light of their conflicting
rationalizations.
This Comment begins with short histories of guilty pleas and collateral
consequence statutes in the U.S. criminal justice system. In particular, Part
II describes the rise in prominence of plea bargaining and the rationale for
its legitimacy in the law, paying particular attention to the pragmatic
justifications driving the increase in guilty pleas and forming the basis for
the legality of the practice. It then goes on to describe the history of
collateral consequences, focusing on the largely recent developments in
sexual offender registration and notification laws. In particular, it explains
that the newly mandated federal system for classification of offenders and
its retroactive application eviscerates the bargains contemplated by guilty
pleas. Stringent notification and registration requirements are levied upon
defendants who had bargained for, and may have even completed, particular
sentences prior to the enactment of the new federal law. Part II concludes
with a survey of the previous constitutional challenges to sexual offender
registration and notification statutes along with a brief description of why
they were unsuccessful. In short, conviction-based offender classification
systems do not violate procedural due process because their application is
determined by the outcome of a criminal trial, and registration and
notification laws do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because they are
civil and non-punitive measures.29 Finally, previous substantive due
process challenges have failed because there is neither a history nor
tradition of not having to register oneself for past sexual offenses.
Part III of this Comment focuses on the contractual rationale for plea
bargains and serves to describe the underlying basis for my eventual
argument. First, it briefly describes the contract-based arguments for and
against plea bargaining. It then continues with a more detailed analysis of
three Supreme Court cases that invoke doctrines of contract law to
adjudicate cases concerning alleged breaches of plea agreements. These
three cases in turn create a limited jurisprudence for analyzing whether plea
agreements are breached by subsequent state action.

29
The fact that registration and notification statutes are constitutional because they rely
solely upon the outcomes of criminal trials, but are simultaneously deemed civil sanctions,
did not escape the author’s attention. This Comment does not attempt to reconcile these
conflicting rationales because the author is simply unable to do so.
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Part IV builds on the jurisprudence derived from these three cases and
explains how it informs the subsequent analysis of the integration of
collateral consequence statutes and plea agreements. In short, if the state is
the bargaining partner to the plea agreement, and the enactment and
enforcement of a collateral consequence statute is a subsequent act by that
party to the contract, then compelling compliance with that statute should
be considered a breach of that plea agreement by the state. Part IV
continues the plea agreement breach analysis by casting the hypothetical
defendant’s claim as a substantive due process challenge. In contrast to the
cases recounted in Part II that were based on the defendant’s right to not
have his or her conviction publicized, this challenge relies instead on the
defendant’s right to have his or her plea agreement enforced—a right that
has considerably more history and tradition.
Having identified a possibly successful challenge to the retroactive
enforcement of collateral consequence statutes, Part V concludes the
Comment by addressing two responses to this contract-based challenge: the
severability doctrine and whether the defendant has assumed the risk of a
subsequently enacted collateral consequence statute. While both defenses
are plausible, neither is particularly conclusive, and, in light of the obvious
unfairness resulting from retroactive collateral consequence statutes, neither
should be fatal to the defendant’s hypothetical claim.
II. BACKGROUND
A. GUILTY PLEAS

It is unclear when the practice of plea bargaining began, as it is
difficult to determine what sentences were the result of a bargain, as
opposed to the result of the normal processes of criminal law.30 Prior to the
1920s, the earliest reported instances of plea bargaining in judicial opinions
concerned the courts’ disapproval of the practice.31 However, studies
suggest that the Prohibition era, possibly due to its corresponding expansion
of criminal codes, was when the widespread usage and acceptance of the
guilty plea in the United States was first acknowledged.32 Surveys of the
criminal justice systems conducted during this period revealed that in at

30

Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 1, at 1-6.
Id. at 5-6.
32
Id.; GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 6 (2003) (“The first wave, in the
1920’s and early 1930’s, marked the true age of plea bargaining’s discovery.”).
31
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least eight major cities, the rate of felony convictions obtained through
guilty pleas was well over 70%.33
Plea bargaining continued without clear judicial legitimacy until the
Supreme Court officially sanctioned the practice in 1970 in Brady v. United
States.34 In Brady, the defendant initially pleaded not guilty to kidnapping
with the aggravated circumstance of inflicting harm upon the victim.35
Upon learning that his codefendant had pleaded guilty and was willing to
testify against him, the defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for a fifty-year
prison sentence and foreclosure of the possibility of a death sentence.36 The
defendant challenged the conviction on the basis of coercion, realized
through the threat of testimony from the codefendant and potential death
penalty if he went to trial.37 Citing the prevalence of the pleas and the
infeasibility of abolition of the practice, the Court upheld the conviction and
validated the practice of plea bargaining.38 The Court’s legal basis for the
decision was that juries and judges have considerable discretion to sentence
defendants; thus, precluding the maximum penalty is a rational choice by
the defendant,39 and guilty pleas are constitutional so long as they meet the
knowing and voluntary requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.40 The Court then specifically noted the “mutuality of
advantage” that is inherent in the plea bargaining process to further support
its holding.41
At the time of the Brady decision, over 75% of all criminal convictions
were obtained through guilty pleas.42 In June of 2009, the Court noted that
guilty pleas now account for over 95% of state and federal convictions.43

33
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, supra note 1, at 26. In 1908, the federal
rate of convictions by guilty plea was about 50%; it increased to 72% in 1916 and was
almost 90% by 1925. Id. at 27.
34
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
35
Id. at 743.
36
Id. at 743-44.
37
Id. at 749-51.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 751.
40
Id. at 751-52. “Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must
address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and
did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).”
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
41
Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
42
Id.
43
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009).
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B. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

The practice of attaching civil penalties to felony and misdemeanor
convictions is just as pervasive as the practice of plea bargaining.
Depending on one’s definition, collateral consequences, at least with
respect to felony disenfranchisement, have origins that predate the U.S.
criminal justice system.44
Currently, federal and state collateral
consequence statutes encompass a number of facets of everyday life,
including eligibility for welfare, public housing, student aid, and alien
residency; the right to vote and serve on a jury; and restrictions on
employment, including the military.45
Sexual offender registration, on the other hand, has a considerably
shorter history. California was the first state to enact a general registration
system for all convicted sexual offenders in 1947.46 Between 1947 and
1993, thirteen states and the federal government passed sexual offender
registration laws,47 but it was not until 1994 that sexual offender registration
gained national prominence with New Jersey’s passage of Megan’s Law.48
Like all of the previously enacted statutes, New Jersey’s Megan’s Law
created a registration system,49 but unlike all but one other state,50 the New
Jersey statute also created a community notification system.51 The
previously enacted federal statute, the Wetterling Act, mandated that the
states implement registration programs, but merely permitted the states to

44
Avi Brisman, Toward a More Elaborate Typology of Environmental Values:
Liberalizing Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Policies, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 283, 331 (2007).
45
Pinard, supra note 7, at 635-36 (citations omitted); see also INTERNAL EXILE, supra
note 15, app. 2.
46
Logan, supra note 9, at 5.
47
See id. at 5-6.
48
Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 2005).
49
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 2005).
50
Washington was actually the first state to allow for community notification. 1990
Wash. Sess. Laws 25 § 117 (“Public agencies are authorized to release relevant and
necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the
information is necessary for public protection.”). It is unclear why New Jersey’s
community-notification law, and not Washington’s, triggered such interest nation-wide and
motivated the federal government to subsequently mandate notification laws in each state.
51
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 (West 2005):

Within 45 days after receiving notification . . . that an inmate convicted of or adjudicated
delinquent for a sex offense . . . is to be released from incarceration and after receipt of
registration as required therein, the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality where the
inmate intends to reside shall provide notification . . . of that inmate’s release to the community.
If the municipality does not have a police force, the Superintendent of State Police shall provide
notification.
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create community notification systems.52 Shortly after New Jersey enacted
its Megan’s Law, Congress amended the Wetterling Act with its own
Megan’s Law in 1996, this time requiring states to implement their own
community notification systems in addition to the existing offender
registration requirement.53
Congress has continued to amend the requirements for state sexual
offender registration and notification systems following the federal
Megan’s Law.54 For the purposes of this Comment, the most recent
amendment, the Walsh Act,55 is the most significant. In particular, it
changed the existing state requirements for registration and notification in
two fundamental ways. First, states must now apply the modified sexual
offender registration and notification requirement provisions of the act
retroactively.56 Second, the Walsh Act requires that states follow a threetiered notification system based solely upon the conviction of the sexual
offender (the “backward-looking” approach).57
Tiered notification systems that are based on the severity of a
defendant’s conviction were not particularly new; numerous states had
already implemented such an approach58 in which more serious crimes
result in community notification, but less serious crimes only result in
notification to law enforcement.59 This backward-looking approach was not
universal, however, as approximately fifteen other states instead used
“forward-looking” approaches, in which tier designations that determine the
extent of community notification are based not just on the severity of the
offender’s conviction, but also on that particular offender’s risk of
recidivism.60 Therefore, the problematic aspect of this provision of the
52

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14701(b) (2006)).
53
Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345, 1345 (1996) (“The designated
State law enforcement agency . . . shall release relevant information that is necessary to
protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section . . . .”)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14701(e)(2) (2006)).
54
Reforms included the creation of a national registration system primarily for law
enforcement purposes and a mandate for states to publish registration information on the
internet. Logan, supra note 9, at 6.
55
Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16901
(2006)).
56
Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2009).
57
Walsh Act § 111.
58
Among them, the New Jersey system created by Megan’s Law. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:7-1 (West 2005).
59
Id.
60
Logan, supra note 9, at 10. For example, the New Jersey Megan’s Law, enacted in
1994, determined notification tier designations through the analysis of these non-exclusive
factors:
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Walsh Act is that it requires that each state use the backward-looking
approach for community notification, which is in direct conflict with the
forward-looking approach that a number of states had individually
implemented and used for some time.61
The significance of these two provisions of the Walsh Act is that,
theoretically, any individual in any state who has pleaded guilty to a sexual
offense for a specified sentence at any time is now subject to, at a
minimum, the registration and notification requirements specified in the act,
regardless of whether or not the individual had pleaded guilty to the offense
or even served the agreed sentence before the enactment of the Walsh Act
in 2006.62 Federalism concerns aside,63 the Walsh Act embodies a

(1) Conditions of release that minimize risk of re-offense, including but not limited to whether the
offender is under supervision of probation or parole; receiving counseling, therapy or treatment;
or residing in a home situation that provides guidance and supervision;
(2) Physical conditions that minimize risk of re-offense, including but not limited to advanced age
or debilitating illness;
(3) Criminal history factors indicative of high risk of re-offense, including: (a) Whether the
offender’s conduct was found to be characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior;
(b) Whether the offender served the maximum term; (c) Whether the offender committed the sex
offense against a child;
(4) Other criminal history factors to be considered in determining risk, including: (a) The
relationship between the offender and the victim; (b) Whether the offense involved the use of a
weapon, violence, or infliction of serious bodily injury; (c) The number, date and nature of prior
offenses;
(5) Whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of recidivism;
(6) The offender’s response to treatment;
(7) Recent behavior, including behavior while confined or while under supervision in the
community as well as behavior in the community following service of sentence; and
(8) Recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to commit additional crimes.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(b) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
61
Logan, supra note 9, at 10.
62
See Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2009); see also
Walsh Act § 124 (“Each jurisdiction shall implement this title before . . . 3 years after the
date of the enactment of this Act . . . .”). States that do not implement the requirements of
the Walsh Act will be subject to a 10% decrease in federal crime prevention funding unless
the state’s highest court rules that certain requirements would violate that state’s
constitution. See id. § 125.
63
Several district courts have held that certain aspects of the Walsh Act are not within
Congress’ power under the Interstate Commerce Clause. E.g., United States v. Powers, 544
F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that the Congress does not have power under
Interstate Commerce Clause to criminalize failure to register by an individual convicted of a
state sex offense). For a more thorough treatment of the federalism problems that the
mandated registration requirements of the Adam Walsh Act creates, see Logan, supra note 9,
at 7-13.
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significant change in terms for those sexual offenders who bargained for a
specific sentence.
C. PREVIOUS CHALLENGES TO SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION

1. Procedural Due Process
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe,64 the state agency
appealed district court and circuit court decisions enjoining it from
employing its sexual offender registration and notification system.65 An
unnamed individual who was subject to the sexual offender registration and
notification system of Connecticut successfully brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the statute creating the registration and
notification system deprived him of a liberty interest—namely his right to
due process.66 At the time of the suit, Connecticut’s registration system
was, like the systems required by the Walsh Act, backward-looking: it
determined the extent of community notification based on the offense of
conviction.67 At the district and circuit court levels, Doe successfully
argued that the registration requirements violated his right to due process
because he was not afforded a hearing to dispute the determination that he
was “currently dangerous.”68 However, the Supreme Court reversed.69
Declining to reach the issue of whether the registration and publication
requirements infringe on a liberty interest,70 the Court held that Doe’s
dangerousness was irrelevant under Connecticut’s registration statute since
it relied solely upon the previous conviction.71 Since Doe’s tier designation
was not based on his current dangerousness, but rather on the outcome of
his trial, the state was not required to provide a hearing before imposing the
sanction, and therefore did not violate procedural due process by failing to

64

538 U.S. 1 (2003).
Id. at 6-7.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 4-5.
68
Id. at 7.
69
Id. at 8.
70
Id. at 7. The Court’s refusal to address whether there was a liberty interest at issue
expressly left open the possibility that such an interest may exist and provide the proper
basis for a substantive due process claim. See id. at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that in
order to succeed in challenging the Connecticut registration system, Doe would have to
claim that a liberty interest was implicated and “that the liberty interest in question was so
fundamental as to implicate so-called ‘substantive’ due process”). While several circuit
courts have addressed substantive due process claims, the Supreme Court thus far has not.
See infra Part II.C.3.
71
Id.
65
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do so.72 It should be noted that states that employ forward-looking
approaches to tier designations do provide hearings for the individuals to
challenge the assessment of their current dangerousness.73
2. Ex Post Facto Clause
In Smith v. Doe, the State of Alaska appealed a decision of the Ninth
Circuit that enjoined the state from enforcing its retroactive, backwardlooking sexual offender registration and notification system because it
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.74 This case is particularly relevant
because the sexual offenders who brought the § 1983 suit had pleaded nolo
contendere to their initial offenses and completed their sentences well
before the state registration system was created.75
The first step for the Court was to determine whether the law was
meant to impose punishment or to impose civil, non-punitive measures.76
Accordingly, the Court looked to “the statute’s text and its structure to
determine the legislative objective.”77 The stated primary intent of the
statute, according to the legislature, is “protecting the public from sex
offenders,”78 which is in keeping with the purposes of the state’s criminal
law. The registration requirements were codified in Alaska’s criminal
procedure code, but the notification provisions were codified in the state’s
“Health, Safety, and Housing Code.”79 Finally, after the enactment of the

72

Id. at 7-8.
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178M (West 1999) (“An offender may seek
judicial review . . . of the board’s final classification and registration requirements.”); OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.J., ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION LAWS § 2 (revised 2007), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/
megan/meganguidelines-2-07.pdf (“The decision [of level of risk of re-offense] is subject to
judicial review in accordance with the procedures established by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.”).
However, such systems with individual determinations of “current dangerousness”
could give rise to equal protection claims. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 10
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that legislative line-drawing among a class of convicted
sexual offenders would be open to challenges under the Equal Protection Clause). Also,
Professor Logan posits that Congress specifically rejected the forward-looking approach and
chose the backward-looking approach for the Walsh Act, because it would not be challenged
on procedural due process grounds in light of Connecticut Department of Public Safety. See
Logan, supra note 9, at 13.
74
538 U.S. 84 (2003).
75
Id. at 91.
76
Id. at 92 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 93 (quoting 1994 ALASKA SESS. LAWS ch. 41, §1).
79
Id. at 94.
73

256

KEVIN O’KEEFE

[Vol. 100

system, Alaska amended its Rules of Criminal Procedure so that the court
must notify defendants of the registration and notification implications of
sexual offenses before it can accept a guilty plea.80 The Court found that
since there is nothing facially apparent from the statute to suggest
otherwise, the statute’s purpose is civil and non-punitive.81
The Court’s next step was to determine whether the effects of the
statute surpass its civil purpose to such an extent that the statute is in fact a
punitive measure.82 Citing the seven-factor test from Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez,83 the Court used five factors as a framework for its analysis:
[W]hether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: [1] has been regarded in
our history and traditions as a punishment; [2] imposes an affirmative disability or
restraint; [3] promotes the traditional aims of punishment; [4] has a rational
84
connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or [5] is excessive with respect to this purpose.

Though the Court remarked at some length upon the similarity of the
statute’s notification provisions to colonial era shaming punishments,85 it
found that the purpose of the scheme is to inform the public, which is nonpunitive.86 Furthermore, the Court stated that the registration and
notification requirements are neither a disability nor a restraint.87
Additionally, the primary purpose of the statute is to deter future crimes and
not for retribution.88 By maintaining its focus on the statute’s purpose of
ensuring safety, the Court found that the measures are reasonable in light of
the non-punitive objective and are not excessive in light of (1) the high risk
of recidivism, (2) the state’s entitlement to categorically judge all convicted

80
Id. at 95. The rule cited by the Court is the same rule in place today; courts are
required to “infor[m] the defendant in writing of the requirements of [the sexual offender
registration law] and, if it can be determined by the court, the period of registration
required.” ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(4). It should be noted that this is the specific type of
protection—informing the criminal defendant of postconviction consequences prior to
acceptance of a plea—that would have barred the defendants in the present case, and any
defendant for that matter, from asserting unfair bargaining on the part of the government.
For a more detailed discussion on notification of criminal defendants in the bargaining
process, see infra Part V.B.
81
Smith, 538 U.S. at 93, 96.
82
Id. at 92.
83
372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
84
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The Court specifically noted that the Kennedy factors migrated
into ex post facto analysis from double jeopardy jurisprudence. Id. Though there has been
no double jeopardy challenge to sexual offender registration in the Supreme Court, it is
assumed that such a case would be treated in a similar fashion.
85
Id. at 97-98.
86
Id. at 99.
87
Id. at 99-101.
88
Id. at 102-03.
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sex offenders as dangerous, and (3) the passive nature of the notification
system.89
3. Substantive Due Process
Though the Court in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe
expressly declined to rule on whether sexual offender registration and
notification provisions violate the substantive due process guarantees of the
Constitution,90 five circuits have ruled that they do not.
In Paul P. v. Verniero,91 an individual subject to the registration and
notification requirements of New Jersey’s Megan’s Law filed a substantive
due process challenge based on the infringement of zones of privacy
guaranteed by Roe v. Wade,92 specifically the “personal rights that can be
deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”93
The Third Circuit held that insofar as the individual’s status as a sexual
offender is disclosed, it is a matter of public record and accordingly does
not infringe upon a privacy interest.94 With regard to the publication of the
individual’s home address, the court held that the public interest served
through notification outweighs the privacy interest and denied the claim.95
In Gunderson v. Hvass,96 the offender (Gunderson) was originally
charged with a violent sexual offense, but bargained to plead guilty to
assault in exchange for the dismissal of the original indictment.97
Gunderson later learned that he was still required to register as a sexually
violent predator under the Minnesota registration and notification scheme,
since his conviction arose out of the same set of circumstances as the
predatory offense.98 Gunderson argued that the statute infringed upon the
89

Id. at 102-06.
538 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
91
170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999).
92
410 U.S. 113 (1972).
93
Paul P., 170 F.3d at 399 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152).
94
Id. at 403-04.
95
Id. at 404.
96
339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003).
97
Id. at 641-42.
98
Id. This aspect of the Minnesota scheme is quite a departure from the general basis for
states to impose registration requirements. Registration is required for every convicted
defendant so long as they are only alleged to have committed a sex offense. Id. Apart from
its incompatibility with the Court’s reasoning in Smith v. Doe, see infra note 100, this “facts
and circumstances” registration system has serious negative implications for criminal
defendants. Criminal defendants do not even have the protections of a criminal trial before
they are subjected to the harms of registration and notification. This problem is only
exacerbated by the practice of prosecutorial overcharging to exert leverage in plea bargains.
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(describing the practice of prosecutorial overcharging in plea negotiations).
90
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fundamental right to the presumption of innocence.99 The Eighth Circuit
applied a two-part analysis to his substantive due process claim. Relying on
Smith v. Doe,100 the court held that the statute is civil and non-punitive, and
therefore there was no presumption of innocence upon which it could
infringe.101 Since there is no infringement on a fundamental right, the state
need only show a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.102
The stated purpose of that portion of the registration scheme was “to insure
the inclusion in the registration rolls, of all predatory offenders, including
those who take advantage of favorable plea agreements.”103 Accordingly,
the claim was denied.104
Doe v. Tandeske was a subsequent appeal of the Smith v. Doe case,105
this time on substantive due process grounds.106 The Ninth Circuit did not
explicitly state its basis for denying the claim, but it appeared to rely upon
the lack of “deep[] root[s] in our history and traditions” to determine that
sexual offenders do not have a fundamental right to be free from
registration and notification.107 The court then relied on Smith v. Doe to
find a rational relation to legitimate government purposes and denied the
claim.108
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed substantive due process for sexual
offenders in Doe v. Moore.109 The plaintiffs contended that Florida’s
registration and notification requirements infringed on their fundamental
99

Id. at 643.
538 U.S. 84 (2003). The Eighth Circuit’s reliance on Smith v. Doe’s determination
that Alaska’s registration was non-punitive is particularly questionable. A considerable part
of the Court’s reasoning that the notification system differed from concededly punitive
colonial shaming practices was based on the fact that Doe had been convicted of a sexual
offense. Id. at 99 (“The [notification] process is more analogous to a visit to an official
archive of criminal records than it is to a scheme forcing an offender to appear in public with
some visible badge of past criminality.”).
101
Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643; see also id. at 644 (“The fact that such a registration
policy may, in fact, require the inclusion of persons who are not predators, is not a fatal
Constitutional defect, since the legislative purpose need only be reasonably related to the
State's interest, and here that legislative purpose is.”).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 643-44.
104
Id. at 644.
105
538 U.S. 84. For further discussion, see supra Part II.C.2.
106
361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2004). Doe also claimed violation of procedural due process,
but this claim was summarily dismissed in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). Tandeske, 361 F.3d at
596.
107
Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 596-97 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)).
108
Id. at 597.
109
410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
100
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rights of liberty and privacy.110 The court disagreed, finding that the only
right at issue was “the right of a person, convicted of ‘sexual offenses,’ to
refuse subsequent registration of his or her personal information . . . and
prevent publication of this information.”111 The court then proceeded to
follow the holdings discussed above and deny the claim.112
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit addressed a substantive due process claim in
Doe v. Michigan Department of State Police.113 The court followed the
reasoning in Doe v. Tandeske114 and Doe v. Moore115 and defined the sexual
offender’s infringed rights to be the right to refuse registration and the right
to prevent publication of information regarding his conviction.116 The court
then found that the infringement of these rights was rationally related to a
legitimate government end based on the statute’s intention to assist law
enforcement in preventing future criminal acts.117
Though these five circuits seem to have definitively answered the
question of whether a substantive due process claim is viable, it is
significant both that the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue and that
the circuit courts have thus far only addressed the issue in terms of the right
to be free from registration and notification requirements. None of the five
cases have addressed whether a defendant who was convicted pursuant to a
plea bargain is entitled to the government’s performance of the bargain.
III. PLEA BARGAINS AND CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS
A. THEORETICAL EVALUATIONS OF THE CONTRACTUAL PLEA
BARGAIN

The plea bargain, as its name makes clear, is most often justified on
contractual grounds. The defendant waives his or her constitutional “rights
to a jury trial, to confront one’s accusers, to present witnesses in one’s
defense, to remain silent, and to be convicted by proof beyond all
reasonable doubt”118 in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation.
But the practice of imposing penal sentences, however the sentence is
ultimately determined, resides in no other area apart from criminal law,
110

Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1344.
112
Id. at 1349.
113
490 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2007).
114
361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2004).
115
410 F.3d 1337.
116
Doe, 490 F.3d at 500-01.
117
Id. at 501.
118
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
111
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which makes for an uneasy fit in contract law.119 Numerous arguments
have been made on constitutional as well as contractual grounds both for
and against the continued practice of plea bargaining.120 For the purposes
of this Comment, the Supreme Court’s validation of the practice in Brady v.
United States,121 along with its specific reference to the “mutuality of
advantage” that results from the bargaining process,122 restricts the
argument to the contractual sphere.
The most common contract-based arguments against the practice of
plea bargaining are acceptance under duress, information disparities,
disparate bargaining power, and the prohibition on enslavement
contracts.123 Though each argument has merit, there are equally persuasive
counter-arguments for each. The purely contractual analysis of plea
bargaining by Robert Scott and William Stuntz is particularly on point for
this purpose.124
The basis for the duress argument is the notion that the large difference
between post-trial and post-plea sentences has a coercive effect on the
defendant.125 However, under basic contract law, the limitation of available
choices (here, pleading to a lesser sentence or risking a greater sentence)
does not make the choice less voluntary.126 Information disparities
produced and encouraged by a party to the contract to the detriment of the
other party will result in an invalid contract.127 In the plea bargain setting,
the claim is that the prosecutor has superior knowledge not only of the
strength of the case but also of the “market value” for such a case.128
However, the defendant is represented by counsel who presumably has
experience in the “market,” and the immediate terms of the plea bargain
more often than not will be limited and clear.129
Disparate bargaining power is easily analogized to “take it or leave it
contracts.”130 This power imbalance is thought to enable the prosecutor to
use leverage to exact specific concessions because the prosecutor is the only

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 1974.
See generally works cited, supra note 1.
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
Id. at 751-52 (1970).
See generally Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 1.
See supra note 1.
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1 at 1920-21.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981).
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 1, at 1922-23.
Id.
Id. at 1923.
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bargaining partner available to the defendant.131 However, each plea
bargain is an individual bargain, and there is a bilateral monopoly as neither
the defendant nor the state is free to negotiate a particular plea agreement
with any other party.132 The cost of trying a case for a prosecutor is far
greater than the cost of individualizing a bargain, so the rational prosecutor
has no choice but to negotiate to some sort of agreement.133
Finally, contracts of enslavement are prohibited to prevent individuals
from bargaining away their autonomy.134
Where imprisonment is
concerned, the plea bargain may be viewed as the “offer” of portions of life
by the defendant as his or her consideration, which should therefore be
prohibited.135 Scott and Stuntz argue that instead of the bargaining of
personal liberty, the plea bargain is the exchange of a risk of greater
sentence for the certainty of lesser sentence.136 Furthermore, the prohibition
of plea bargaining would result in the reduction of individual autonomy by
forcing the defendant to undertake the risk of longer imprisonment.137
While there are considerably more detailed and nuanced arguments in
contract law for and against the justification of plea bargaining, it is clear
that the debate is not one-sided, and an academic resolution to the matter is
not readily apparent. The importance, then, is the application of such
contractual arguments in courts.
B. CONTRACT BREACH ANALYSIS IN THE COURTS

While the Supreme Court has not and undoubtedly will not evaluate
plea bargains on purely contractual grounds, three cases addressing the
breach of plea agreements demonstrate the Court’s willingness to evaluate
disputes surrounding performance of plea bargains in traditional contractual
terms. These cases demonstrate how a court might determine the existence
of a breach, the performance required for an enforceable contract, and the
available remedies.
In Santobello v. New York,138 the defendant was offered and ultimately
accepted a plea bargain whereby he would plead guilty to a lesser included
offense in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to refrain from making a
sentence recommendation.139 The plea was made, but sentencing was
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

See id.
See id.
Id. at 1924.
Id. at 1929.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1929-30.
404 U.S. 257 (1971).
Id. at 258.
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delayed, in part because the defendant moved to withdraw the guilty plea.140
After the replacement of both the original judge and prosecutor, the motion
to withdraw the plea was denied.141 At sentencing, the new prosecutor
recommended the maximum sentence for the lesser offense, and the new
judge imposed it over the defense’s objection that it was in clear violation
of the plea agreement.142 In reversing the conviction, the Court deferred to
the state court to determine the particular remedy, but stated quite clearly
that such a breach of the agreement by the prosecution invalidates the plea,
as plea bargains must be respected to ensure that the defendant receives
what is reasonably expected when he surrenders fundamental rights.143 The
Court stated further that “a constant factor [in plea bargaining] is that when
a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”144 While leaving resolution
of the issue of the proper remedy due to the defendant in Santobello
noticeably undecided,145 the Court made clear that the failure of the
prosecution to perform its end of the plea agreement should result in some
remedy for the defendant.146
The Court’s next evaluation of the performance of a plea agreement
concerned an offer, acceptance, and withdrawal before the plea could be
entered in court. In Mabry v. Johnson, the defendant was already
incarcerated for related offenses when plea negotiations began for a
separate conviction that had been overturned on appeal.147 In exchange for
a plea of guilty to the outstanding charge, the prosecutor originally offered a
sentence recommendation of twenty-one years, to be served concurrently
with the sentence the defendant was already serving.148 When the defense
attorney called to accept, however, the prosecutor withdrew the offer,
claiming it had been a mistake.149 Instead, the prosecutor offered a plea of
twenty-one years, to be served consecutively to the existing sentence, which
the defendant ultimately accepted.150 In denying the defendant’s claim to
140

Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 259.
142
Id. at 259-60.
143
Id. at 262.
144
Id. at 262.
145
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated specifically that in cases of breach of
plea agreement, the defendant should have the options of specific performance of the bargain
or reclaiming his right to trial on the original charges. Id. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Id. at 263.
147
467 U.S. 504, 505-06 (1984).
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Id.
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Id. at 506.
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Id.
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compel performance of the prosecutor’s first offer, the Court defined the
point at which a plea bargain becomes enforceable: “A plea bargain
standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere
executory agreement which, until embodied in a judgment of the court, does
not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected
interest.”151 The Court stated further that the defendant’s subsequent guilty
plea foreclosed any argument for detrimental reliance on the original plea,
finding that the question of whether the prosecutor was culpable in making
an offer that was later withdrawn was irrelevant.152 The dispositive issue
was whether the defendant was deprived of his liberty unfairly.153
Mabry’s importance goes beyond the affirmation of Santobello’s
requirement for a remedy upon the breach of plea agreements. The Court
clearly stated that a finding of breach first requires the defendant’s
performance of the plea agreement. Furthermore, the breach is only
material if there is a deprivation of liberty; prosecutorial intent or motive
has no bearing on materiality.154
The final case regarding the breach of plea agreements considered
once again the extent of performance required by the parties and the
determination of a breach. The defendant in Ricketts v. Adamson was
charged with first-degree murder in connection with a car bombing.155 The
defendant agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder, serve twenty
years in prison, and testify against his codefendants, in exchange for which
the prosecution dismissed the charge of first-degree murder.156 The
phrasing of the agreement is of particular importance in this case. As part
of the deal, the defendant pledged to testify and to testify truthfully, or else
the “entire agreement is null and void and the original charge will be
automatically reinstated.”157 Additionally, the agreement provided that if it
was nullified, “the parties shall be returned to the positions they were in
before this agreement.”158 The defendant made the plea, testified against
his codefendants, and began to serve the agreed upon sentence.159
However, the convictions of his codefendants were overturned and
remanded for retrial.160 When the prosecution sought to have the defendant
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 507.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.
See id.
483 U.S. 1, 3 (1987).
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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testify again, he refused unless the government agreed to release him
following the trial.161 The prosecutor notified defendant’s counsel that he
was deemed to be in breach of the agreement and reinstated the original
indictment a month later.162 Once the first-degree murder charge was
reinstated, the defendant offered to testify, but the government refused, and
the retrial of his codefendants proceeded without him.163 The defendant
was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.164
The defendant appealed on grounds that the reinstatement of the
indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.165
The Court declined to uphold the challenge, focusing its analysis on the
language and performance of the plea agreement.166 First, the Court
delineated the intended outcomes of the plea agreement and noted that each
party “received substantial benefits” under its terms.167 Next, the Court
referenced the specific language of the agreement as the basis for its
decision.168 The enforcement of an agreement according to the plain
language of its terms is not itself revolutionary, but is significant here in
that the Court relied upon the terms of the agreement to infer the waiver of
a constitutional right.169 Such an inference is particularly noteworthy in
light of previous statements by the Court that an effective waiver of a
constitutional right is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.”170
The defendant also argued that he could not have waived his double
jeopardy rights until his disputed obligations under the agreement were
fully and completely determined by a court.171 The Court found that the
defendant made a “voluntary choice” when he decided not to testify.
Ricketts could have testified in the second trial at the risk of not being
actually required to testify.172 Instead Ricketts chose not to testify and
instead risked breaching the plea agreement.173

161
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See id. at 9-10.
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Ricketts presents the most striking example of contract law’s presence
in claims concerning plea bargains. The Court not only held that the
language of the plea agreement provided sufficient basis for an implicit
waiver of constitutional rights, but also held that the loss of constitutional
rights is within the scope of “damages” that can result from intentional
nonperformance of the agreement.174
The wholesale acceptance and usage of contract law in the criminal
context of plea bargains is not only unlikely, but also undesirable. While
contract performance and remedies often can be measured through some
sort of market valuation, valuation of the utility of human life and
inalienable rights is a troubling practice for the law to undertake, never
mind the inherent difficulty. However, courts clearly have adopted contract
law determinations of breach and performance. According to Mabry, actual
performance of the plea agreement is the precursor to an enforceable
contract.175 Santobello provides that nonperformance will result in breach
and remedy for the damaged party.176 Mabry stated that infringement of a
liberty interest is considered a material breach.177 Finally, in Ricketts, the
terms of a plea agreement and nonperformance are significant enough to
implicate waivers of constitutional rights.178 Though this is by no means a
comprehensive jurisprudence, these cases provide an excellent framework
for analyzing plea agreements in light of retroactive collateral consequence
statutes.
IV. CHALLENGING RETROACTIVE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE STATUTES
UNDER THE SANTOBELLO, MABRY, AND RICKETTS STRUCTURE
A. GENERAL FEASIBILITY AND APPLICATION

Having now established an admittedly scant but informative
framework for the interpretation of plea agreements, it is possible to
scrutinize the intuitive argument for defining retroactive collateral
consequence statutes as breaches of bilateral contracts. In particular, this
framework allows for evaluation of the specific circumstances of retroactive
application of collateral consequence statutes to plea-convicted defendants.
Furthermore, one can determine the feasibility of a successful challenge and
the availability of a remedy.

174
175
176
177
178

See id.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984).
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509.
Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 10-11.
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According to Mabry, a plea agreement is only enforceable upon the
entrance of the plea with the court.179 For purposes of the present argument,
which concerns only the retroactive application of collateral consequences,
this requirement is moot, as the plea would necessarily have been entered
for collateral consequences to apply. The plea agreements at issue here are
therefore enforceable under Mabry and will not be deemed constitutionally
insignificant on this ground. Whether such agreements nonetheless
“deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected
interest”180 will be addressed below.
Under Santobello, the existence of a contract between two parties is
definitively established when a plea agreement is reached.181 Courts will
safeguard plea agreements by requiring the parties to perform and fulfill
promises when they are part of the inducement of (or consideration for) a
plea bargain.182 For the purposes of this analysis, the plea-convicted
defendant has a contract with the prosecutor. Additionally, the prosecutor
must fulfill promises with regard to sentence recommendations, including
duration and type of sentence imposed.183 In return, the defendant must
fulfill his obligations of the agreement upon actual acceptance of the plea
agreement, which, per Mabry, means after the plea is entered. Any further
obligations of the defendant under the contract must also be fulfilled
according to Ricketts, presumably including serving the bargained-for
sentence.
However, the prosecutor acts only in an agency capacity, so the true
parties to the agreement are the defendant and the government. The
defendant does not owe the individual prosecutor the continued obligations
of service of sentence and other duties specific to his agreement. The
converse would also be true. Under Santobello, the replacements of the
prosecutor and the judge were irrelevant once the plea was entered and
enforceable.184 Accordingly, the obligation to fulfill sentencing promises
lies with the government.
Both Santobello and Ricketts imply that an actionable breach of a plea
agreement occurs when parties do not perform. Under Santobello, the
failure to fulfill a promise that was an inducement to the agreement is a
breach.185 The determination of breach in Ricketts was considerably more
specific to the circumstances of the agreement; however, the Court’s
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507-08.
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determination that the defendant waived his constitutional right to
protection from double jeopardy through his intentional nonperformance of
the plea agreement is significant.186
In the context of the contract between the government and the
defendant, the government’s failure to fulfill its promise of a specific
sentence can be viewed as abreach per Santobello. Furthermore, the
enactment of retroactive punitive collateral consequence statutes is an
intentional act of nonperformance, even though undertaken by a different
branch of the government.
A state bargains with the decided majority of defendants in sex offense
cases; if those defendants complete their agreed upon sentences, it is hard to
view the retroactive imposition of a registration and notification scheme
enacted after the bargains as anything but the state reneging upon the terms
of each of those plea bargains. The defendant agrees to serve a particular
sentence, but the state violates this agreement by adding on numerous
additional postconviction requirements that could not have even been
contemplated during the actual bargaining process. In this scenario, the
state has no constitutional rights to inferentially waive through intentional
nonperformance.
It is worth noting, however, that intentional
nonperformance of a plea agreement can have implications that rise to the
level of waiver of a constitutional right, at least according to the Court’s
reasoning in Ricketts.
With regard to remedy,187 Santobello expressly left the issue open,
though it suggested requiring specific performance of the plea and allowing
the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea as possible remedies.188
The inferential waiver of double jeopardy for the defendant in Ricketts only
gives further credence to the availability of a remedy for the wronged party
in a breach of plea agreement in suggesting that an appropriate remedy
could be on the order of the waiver of a constitutional right.189 For the
purposes of the plea-convicted defendant, specific performance of the plea
agreement would render application of the collateral consequence statute to
the defendant a breach on behalf of the government and would render the
retroactive aspect inapplicable under the same logic. Having completed or
begun to undertake his bargained-for sentence, the defendant should be able
to hold the state to the terms of the agreement, and disregard the newly
enacted statute. Though it would be of much greater import to those plea186

Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1987).
The determination of whether such a breach would be material requires much more
detailed analysis relative to this section, and accordingly is addressed infra, Part IV.B.
188
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63; accord Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 n.11
(1984).
189
Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 9-10.
187
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convicted defendants who are currently incarcerated, the opportunity to
withdraw the plea would be a considerable remedy for all plea-convicted
defendants, as they would regain their most valuable consideration in the
bargain: their waived constitutional rights.
B. MATERIAL BREACH AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The Mabry court identified the “depriv[ation] of . . . liberty in any
fundamentally unfair way” as the proper standard for a finding of breach.190
Though the language is more lenient, the court was clearly alluding to a due
process violation.191 The application of this standard to the posited scenario
is admittedly daunting, as the Supreme Court and five circuit courts have
already addressed the issue specifically as it pertains to sexual offender
registration.192
The possibility of a finding of a procedural due process violation is
currently foreclosed by Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.193
Similarly, all five of the circuits that have addressed challenges to
retroactive sexual offender statutes have not found substantive due process
violations.194 However, in each of these decisions, the defendants claimed
violations of their liberty and privacy interests.195 In each case, the court
invoked the first step of due process analysis and began its inquiry by
crafting its own “careful description of the asserted right.”196 Therefore, the
asserted claims of liberty and privacy rights were limited to the rights (1)
not to be compelled to register and (2) not to have one’s personal
information published.197 Since freedom from sexual offender notification
and registration is not a right that is, by anyone’s definition, “deeply rooted

190
See Mabry, 467 U.S. at 511. This would not necessarily be the exclusive definition of
material breach. In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, conditions for a finding of
material breach include “[t]he greater or less hardship on the party failing to perform in
terminating the contract; The wilful, negligent or innocent behavior of the party failing to
perform; The greater or less uncertainty that the party failing to perform will perform the
remainder of the contract.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 275 (1981). Each of
these factors is plainly relevant in this interpretation of retroactive collateral consequence
statutes.
191
Mabry, 467 U.S. at 510-11.
192
See supra Parts II.C.1 & 3.
193
538 U.S. 1 (2003); see supra Part II.C.1.
194
See supra Part II.C.3.
195
See, e.g., Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 399-400 (3d Cir. 1999). Paul P. in
particular referenced the “guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy” of Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
196
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
197
See, e.g., Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005).
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in this Nation’s history and tradition,”198 each substantive due process claim
was therefore subject to the highly deferential rational basis standard of
review.199 Though the stated purposes for the statutes differed in each case,
each court disposed of the remainder of the two-prong test with references
to the legislative purposes of the statutes: to deter criminals and protect the
public.200
By framing the argument in terms of contract enforcement, the pleaconvicted defendant may be able to make a stronger substantive due process
claim. The defendant, when confronted with a retroactive collateral
consequence statute, could claim a substantive due process violation of his
right to be free from government impairment of his contracts instead of his
liberty or privacy interest.201 In keeping with the steps for analyzing a
substantive due process claim, a more particular description of that asserted
right would be the right to performance of the obligations specified by a
plea bargain contract. As noted above,202 such a right is deeply rooted in
U.S. history and traditions, as plea agreements have been used and enforced
in the United States since the end of the nineteenth century at the latest,203
and gained prevalence in the criminal justice system almost one hundred
years ago.204 By framing the claim in terms of enforcement of a bargain,
plea-convicted defendants should have a better chance at least to require the
courts to provide more than a facial justification from the state statute under
the rational basis standard.
A finding of infringement of a fundamental right or liberty interest,
and the resulting need for strict scrutiny analysis, has been fairly rare in
substantive due process claims, at least relative to the rational basis
standard. It is even less likely that plea-convicted defendants asserting a
contractual enforcement right would be deemed a “suspect class,” which
normally provides the basis for strict scrutiny and requires the state to show
a compelling state interest.205 A possible argument could be made for the
implementation of intermediate scrutiny, though it has yet to be applied to
substantive due process claims.206

198

Id. at 1343.
See id. at 1345-46.
200
See, e.g., id. at 1346-47.
201
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10 (“No state shall . . . make . . . [any] law impairing the
obligation of contracts . . . .”).
202
See supra Part II.A.
203
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and its History, supra note 1, at 19-24.
204
Id. at 26-27.
205
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
206
See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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Though the substantive due process argument on the basis of the right
to contract performance admittedly relies heavily on a relatively small
number of opinions to create a possible cause of action, the previous
practice of challenging collateral consequence laws through direct
constitutional challenges has to this point been unsuccessful.207 If the
substantive due process claim can be reframed as an impairment of contract
performance, and the imposition of collateral consequences on pleabargained defendants can be found to be a “depriv[ation] of [] liberty in any
fundamentally unfair way,”208 then that deprivation will constitute a
material breach of the agreement. Plea-convicted defendants would be able
to make a successful challenge against retroactive collateral consequence
statutes, and the remedies of rescission and specific performance from
Santobello209 and Mabry210 would be available to enforce their original
bargains.
V. CHALLENGES FOR THE PLEA-CONVICTED DEFENDANT WHERE THE
STATE IS THE BARGAINING PARTNER
A. SEVERABILITY AND THE SOVEREIGN ACTS DOCTRINE

The contractual challenge to retroactive collateral consequence statutes
for plea-convicted defendants relies considerably upon the premise that the
state as bargaining partner is deemed the equivalent of the state as lawgiver.
The sovereign acts doctrine, though exclusively applied towards the state in
commercial contracts,211 nonetheless should be addressed. The notion of
severability is particularly relevant in this context, as the judiciary arm of
the state is the bargaining partner, and the legislative arm is responsible for
the nonperformance of the contract through passage of the retroactive
collateral consequence statute.
Horowitz v. United States212 is one of the more notable cases applying
this doctrine. Horowitz contracted with the government for the purchase of
silk, which he then intended to resell at a profit.213 Horowitz made payment
as dictated, but the shipment from the government was delayed several
days, due in part to the government’s imposition of an embargo on silk. In
the intervening days between the agreed shipping date and Horowitz’ actual
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

See supra Part II.C.3.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984).
404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971).
467 U.S. at 511 n.11.
30 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:56 (4th ed. 2008).
267 U.S. 458 (1925).
Id. at 459.
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receipt, the price of silk dropped substantially, causing him to lose over ten
thousand dollars in the subsequent transaction.214 Horowitz filed suit
against the government for the amount of the loss. The Court denied his
claim under the sovereign acts doctrine, stating that “the United States
when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the
performance of a particular contract resulting from its public and general
acts as a sovereign.”215 The Court’s further rationale for the decision, that
“the two characters which the government possesses as a contractor and as a
sovereign cannot be thus fused,”216 was cited with approval for seventy
years afterwards. In the context of the plea bargain, such precedent would
clearly be a bar to recovery for the defendant. The stated intent and purpose
of every sexual offender registration and notification statutory scheme
involves some invocation of the protection of the public, which is
undoubtedly within the purview of “public and general acts as a
sovereign.”217
In 1996, the Court retreated from the stance of Horowitz considerably.
The case of United States v. Winstar Corp. concerned a more complex
transaction, but addressed the severability precedent of Horowitz directly.218
Winstar and other financial institutions agreed with the government to
purchase failing banks, in exchange for preferable regulatory accounting
treatment on those purchases.219 A subsequent congressional act in 1989
forbade the favorable accounting practice that had been given to the
institutions in exchange for their purchase of the failing banks.220 The
institutions then brought suit on contractual grounds for their lost value.221
By allowing the suit to go forward in spite of the sovereign acts doctrine,
the Court severely limited the scope of the pronouncements from Horowitz.
The government argued that the sovereign acts doctrine requires a showing
that the legislature acted to avoid the government’s contractual
obligations.222 The Court found that severability was not so clear and that
attempts to draw a line between government as contractor and government
as lawgiver would prove more difficult.223 The Court instead advocated for
a more holistic approach, achieved “by asking whether the sovereign act is
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 461.
Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865)).
Id.
518 U.S. 839 (1996).
Id. at 847-48.
Id. at 847-57.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 891.
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properly attributable to the Government as contractor.”224 If it is not, the
Court asks “whether that act would otherwise release the Government from
liability under ordinary principles of contract law.”225
The sovereign acts defense raises a number of interesting issues in the
context of the plea-convicted defendant. Following the Court’s two-step
approach in Winstar, the first question is whether a collateral consequence
statute is attributable to the state in its role as a plea bargain partner. The
government’s purpose for contracting with a defendant is for the traditional
purposes of criminal justice: deterrence and retribution. The legislative
purpose behind the government’s retroactive collateral consequence statute
is generally the same: promotion of public safety.226 While the purposes of
government actions in both the legislative role (enacting collateral
consequence statutes) and the executive role (prosecuting and bargaining
with defendants) are more or less equivalent, it is unclear whether collateral
consequence statutes are attributable to a state government acting in the
particular capacity of plea bargaining partner. Government actions in both
roles are for the same purpose, but the purpose of such acts is broad—for
the public and general welfare of its citizens—which cuts against a finding
of attribution.227
As for the second question in the Winstar inquiry, substituting an
individual in place of the government as contracting party would allow for
the sovereign acts defense. If the defendant had bargained with another
individual for a fixed-term manual labor contract in return for a waiver of
his or her constitutional rights, subsequent legislation that extended all labor
contracts by ten years would not create liability for the defendant against
the individual. Accordingly, if the sovereign acts doctrine was applicable to
plea bargaining, under Winstar it could provide a considerable defense.
A more recent decision in the Federal Claims Court stated the
determining factors for the sovereign acts doctrine differently, but in
keeping with Winstar. This alternative articulation states that “the inquiry
into possible ‘targeting’ by Congress is relevant to determining whether the
alleged breach is merely an incidental effect of a sovereign act designed to
promote the public good, or instead is a deliberate attempt by Congress to

224

Id. at 896.
Id.
226
For example, Congress enacted the Walsh Act “[i]n order to protect the public from
sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by
violent predators against the victims listed below.” Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 102, 120 Stat.
587, 590 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006)).
227
See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 895-96 (stating that “public and general” acts are attributable
to the government as sovereign and not as contractor).
225
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alter its previous bargain with the contractor.”228 Under this formulation,
the issue is closer. Sexual offender registration and notification systems
target anyone who has been convicted of a sexual offense, regardless of
how that conviction was obtained. The Walsh Act defines “sex offender”
as “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense,” without
qualification,229 and applies to any “individual convicted of a sex
offense”230 at any time.231 While the stated purpose of the registration
requirements applies to all offenders, the prevalence of the practice of plea
bargaining has made plea-convicted defendants the de facto targets of
retroactive registration and notification requirements. In 2008, over 88% of
sexual offense convictions were obtained through plea bargaining.232
Keeping this percentage in mind, one could also argue that the state must be
acting deliberately to frustrate these individual plea bargains when it enacts
these types of registration and notification laws.
B. ASSUMPTION OF RISK

A typical proposed solution to the problems resulting from collateral
consequences and plea bargaining is to require full disclosure of such
consequences prior to the acceptance of a plea.233 While such requirements
are in place in some systems for certain collateral consequences,234 some
commentators have argued that the consequences that attach to any given
conviction are both too numerous and disparately codified to be realistically
disclosed prior to the entry of a typical plea.235 In particular, the court
practitioners themselves (the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney)
cannot accurately identify or anticipate the extent of collateral
consequences that will result from a particular conviction, especially when
some of those consequences may be applied retroactively.236 Therefore, an
argument can be made that the duty and responsibility of information and
228

Coast-to-Coast Fin. Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 796, 804 (2000).
Walsh Act § 111(1).
230
Id.
231
Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2009).
232
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.11
(2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/Table11.pdf.
233
E.g., COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIM. SANCTIONS, A.B.A., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES ON REPRESENTATION RELATING TO COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES (2007),
available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR209800/newsletterpubs/
Report.V.PDF.121306.pdf.
234
Alaska courts are required to “infor[m] the defendant in writing of the requirements
of [the sexual offender registration law] and, if it can be determined by the court, the period
of registration required.” ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(4).
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Pinard, supra note 7, at 638-39.
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disclosure should not lie with anyone. Instead, the imposition of unknown
collateral consequences on plea-bargained defendants can be justified on
the grounds that they had assumed the risk of unknown civil sanctions or
retroactive sanctions to be enacted after the plea is entered.
This defense appears meritorious, and numerous courts have held that
there is no duty on the part of the state to disclose the collateral
consequences resulting from a conviction.237 The application in this
specific context, however, conflicts with basic theoretical premises of
contract law. Since neither party can claim to have knowledge of the
collateral consequences, the plea-convicted defendant has the option of
voiding the contract unless the risk is specifically allocated to him.238 Scott
and Stuntz provide the most reasonable justification for the voiding power
of the plea-convicted defendant in their risk-centered description of the plea
bargain:
Before contracting, the defendant bears the risk of conviction with the maximum
sentence while the prosecutor bears the reciprocal risk of a costly trial followed by
acquittal. An enforceable plea bargain reassigns these risks. Thereafter, the
defendant bears the risk that a trial would have resulted in acquittal or a lighter
sentence, while the prosecutor bears the risk that she could have obtained the
maximum (or at least a greater) sentence if the case had gone to trial.239

While the prosecutors may not have the duty to inform, there is simply no
justification for the plea-convicted defendant to bear the risk of the mutual
lack of knowledge of collateral consequences that are in effect an extension
of his or her sentence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The practice of plea bargaining and the extensive imposition of
collateral consequence statutes are both justified for practical reasons, and
237

See, e.g., Wilson v. McGinnis, 413 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2005) (expressing that
there is no need to inform defendant that state sentence would run consecutively with
previously imposed state sentence); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004)
(expressing that there is no need to inform defendant that committal for life as sexually
dangerous person was possible result of guilty plea); United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d
252, 256-57 (5th Cir. 2000) (expressing that there is no need to inform defendant that federal
sentence would run consecutive to state sentence); United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d
177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (expressing that there is no need to inform defendant that plea could
lead to collateral consequence of deportation); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7-8
(4th Cir. 1988) (expressing same).
238
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152(1) (1981):
Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on
which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the
contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mistake . . . .
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the prevalence of each in the United States criminal justice system
represents an acceptance, if not a full embrace, of each. Both practices are
also subject to extensive criticism, largely stemming from often legitimate
concerns about the protection of individual criminal defendants. Both
practices have been challenged individually on numerous constitutional
grounds, and both have withstood that scrutiny more often than not.
The overwhelming presence of both collateral consequences and plea
bargaining has led to the inevitable combination of the two. At this point of
intersection, the criticisms find more resonance, and the theoretical
justifications seem less suited to the task. My argument has focused on one
particular act, the Walsh Act, primarily because it seems to embody the
most dangerous aspects of both practices retroactivity for collateral
consequence statutes and extended punishment for plea bargaining hidden
in a civil sanction.
Both practices have numerous supporters and detractors in legal
scholarship, but their existence in the courts provides the most substance
with which to analyze both systems. The fundamental theoretical
justification for plea bargaining, freedom of contract, has been both
recognized and adopted by the courts. Collateral consequence statutes,
specifically with regard to sexual offender registration, have been
challenged numerous times on constitutional issues, and thus had the
greater survey of precedent.
Having adopted a limited framework for the analysis of plea
bargaining, I intended to create an argument for the defendant that resides at
the intersection of both practices. Though the contract-based approach for
which I advocate requires some longer logical leaps than others, the pleaconvicted defendant has a possible means of defending against the
retroactive collateral consequence statutes that the Walsh Act represents.
What is most important about the process is the recognition that plea
bargaining and collateral consequences have an uneasy coexistence
constitutionally, regardless of their pervasiveness in the U.S. criminal
justice system. Additionally, it is possible that this type of argument may
have already won in a federal court.
Currently, Nevada’s attempt to implement the requirements of the
Walsh Act is enjoined by a federal district court order.240 The American
Civil Liberties Union of Nevada and a number of unnamed plaintiffs filed
suit to enjoin Nevada’s enactment of Assembly Bill No. 579, which would,

240
See ACLU v. Masto, No. 2:08-cv-00822-JCM-PAL, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 7, 2008)
(granting a permanent injunction), appeal docketed, No. 08-17471 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2008)
(order granting preliminary injunction); see also Carri Geer Thevenot, Offender Statute
Restricted, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 11, 2008, at A1.
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among other things, require retroactive application of sexual offender
registration and notification and replace Nevada’s previous forward-looking
classification system with a conviction-based scheme.241 Though the
district court in ACLU of Nevada v. Masto based its opinion on
constitutional grounds that, as noted above, have already been invalidated
by the Supreme Court (the Ex Post Facto Clause, procedural due process),
the court also stated that the new registration system violated the Contracts
Clauses of both the U.S. and Nevada Constitutions.242 While the case has
yet to be heard by the Ninth Circuit, and the injunction order was not
accompanied by an opinion, Masto indicates that courts are willing to
consider arguments based on performance of plea bargains. At the very
least, it has held up enforcement of the Walsh Act in Nevada.
While this legal argument could easily be invalidated by a number of
minor adjustments to either system, more likely than not, these minor
adjustments would affirm some of the rights of the defendant that carry less
weight in the current system. Some proposals for adjustments that I have
come across include requiring disclosures of all possible future collateral
consequence to criminal defendants, regardless of their plea; promoting
entirely forward-looking risk assessments of sexual offenders upon release;
requiring individualized assessments of sexual offenders for tier
designations and notifications; presenting the defendant with the option to
try his case, plea bargain, or be tried by an informal bench tribunal;
requiring all plea bargains to be made and executed in writing; and, perhaps
most importantly, increasing resources for indigent criminal defense,
prosecutors’ offices, and the judiciary.243
The practices of plea bargaining and collateral consequences are far
too pervasive to continue without a challenge that specifically addresses the
combinations of the two. I believe that there is a reasonable argument in
contract to support that assertion.

241

Masto, at *4; see also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 179D.113, 115, 117 (2008).
Masto, at *4.
243
Because of scarce financial resources, the argument against the Walsh Act may have
been mooted already. As of October 2009, only one state and a Native American
Reservation have implemented a registration and notification system that complies with the
Walsh Act. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces First Two
Jurisdictions to Implement Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (Sept. 23,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/
2009/SMART09154.htm; 2007 OHIO LEGIS. SERV. ANN. 10 (West); see also Abby
Goodnough & Monica Davey, Effort to Track Sex Offenders Draws Resistance from States,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at A1. In addition to the belief that their pre-existing systems are
more effective, states are refusing to implement the Walsh Act because it would cost more
than the presumptive loss of grant money. Id. With a statutory effective date of July 27,
2009, it appears that many states may in fact repeal the Walsh Act by ignoring it.
242

